India Explained
ImplementedINCIndira Gandhi

High-Yielding Varieties Programme (Green Revolution)

Programme from 1966-67 distributing imported high-yielding wheat seed with fertiliser, irrigation and assured procurement; foodgrain output rose and net imports fell by the early 1970s, alongside other changes.

Irrigation, Subsidies

Facts

  • In 1964-65 India's wheat output was 12.26 million tonnes and wheat imports were 6.57 million tonnes (about 54% of domestic output); in 1965-66 output fell to 10.40 million tonnes and imports rose to 7.83 million tonnes (figures summarised from the Shanta Kumar committee report in the Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics) [1].
  • In 1966 the Government of India imported about 18,000 tonnes of high-yielding wheat seed from Mexico and distributed it to farmers [1]. The entry date (1 April 1966, the start of 1966-67) is a convenience marker for the first high-yielding-variety season; accounts differ on an exact launch date.
  • The seed was paired with the January 1965 creation of the Agricultural Prices Commission (minimum support prices) and the Food Corporation of India (procurement), which the committee summary describes as a 'combination of new technology and positive price policy' [1].
  • Gross foodgrain production was 108.4 million tonnes in 1970-71 and 176.4 million tonnes in 1990-91; wheat rose from 23.8 to 55.1 million tonnes over the same period [2].
  • Net imports of foodgrains were 7.4 million tonnes in 1965, 3.6 million tonnes in 1970 and net negative (a small net export) in 1972 [2].
  • Punjab and Haryana supplied 49% of rice and 82% of wheat to the central pool in 1999-2000 (up to July), according to figures reported by Down To Earth [3].

Why

Reasons given by those who did it

  • The Shanta Kumar committee summary records the policy as a response to food shortage and heavy reliance on imports under PL 480, which it describes as aid with 'political repercussions' [1].
  • The same summary presents the seed-plus-price-support package as the means to raise domestic output of wheat and rice so that farmers had an incentive to adopt new varieties [1].

Criticism of that reasoning

  • Abhijit Sen (then Chairperson of the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices) is quoted as saying sustainability was not a criterion when the strategy was adopted; Pramod Kumar (Institute for Development and Communication) called it a 'grain revolution' based on a 'reductionist' strategy [3].
  • M. S. Swaminathan warned in January 1968 that intensive cultivation and irrigation without drainage or soil conservation could lead to salinity and water exhaustion, as quoted by Down To Earth [3].

Benefits and concerns

Benefits (2)

  • Higher grain output and lower import dependence within about five years of the programme.Gross foodgrain production 108.4 Mt (1970-71) to 176.4 Mt (1990-91); net foodgrain imports 7.4 Mt (1965) to about nil by 1972 [2]. Other factors (irrigation expansion, prices, weather) also contributed, so the series does not isolate the effect of the seed programme.
  • Created a surplus-producing region that supplied the public distribution system.Punjab and Haryana provided 49% of rice and 82% of wheat to the central pool in 1999-2000 (up to July) [3]; public distribution of foodgrains grew from 10.1 Mt (1965) to 28.3 Mt (2004) [2].

Concerns (2)

  • Productivity growth slowed and groundwater, waterlogging and salinity problems were reported in the main adopting regions.An ICAR 1998 report quoted by Down To Earth put Punjab and Haryana rice productivity growth at 8.97% a year on average in 1965-74, about 2% in the mid-1980s and about 1% a year in the following decade; David Seckler (International Irrigation Management Institute) described India as depleting groundwater reserves to expand agriculture [3].
  • Gains were concentrated in irrigated wheat and rice areas rather than spread across crops and regions.Critics quoted by Down To Earth describe a 'grain revolution' in which wheat and rice dominated [3]; the wheat growth rate quoted for the late 1960s (almost 5% a year) fell to 3.5% by the late 1980s [3].

Evidence points

+14.0
points, mean of two scorers (scale −25 to +25)
+14 to +14
range between the two scorers' totals
Medium confidence
scorers agree within 1 point on every criterion
ReachHow many people did the action materially affect?
Mean +5.0A +5B +5
Outcome evidenceDo official or independent data show the intended result (or its opposite), compared with the era baseline and peers?
Mean +4.0A +4B +4
Cost and sustainabilityIs the fiscal cost proportionate, and is the effect durable?
Mean +1.0A +1B +1
Process and rightsWas it made with debate, consultation and legal soundness, and did it respect rights and court rulings?
Mean 0.0A 0B 0
DeliveryWas it implemented as announced, on time and at scale?
Mean +4.0A +4B +4

Positive meanNegative meanScorer AScorer B

Scorer A. Foodgrain output rose from 108 to 176 million tonnes and net imports fell to nil by 1972, though groundwater and slowing productivity raise durability concerns.

Scorer B. Foodgrain output rose from 108 to 176 million tonnes and net imports ended by 1972, though groundwater and productivity problems emerged in adopting regions.

Context used when scoring

Era baseline
Mid-1960s: repeated shortfalls in wheat, imports of about 6-8 million tonnes a year under PL 480, and foreign-exchange reserves of about US$524 million in 1964-65 (per the committee summary).
Lag before outcomes show
5 years
Shocks considered
1965-66 fall in wheat output, 1972-74 dip in foodgrain output and the 1973-74 international price crisis
Uncertainty
Medium confidence. Scorer totals are +14 and +14. How uncertainty is shown.

In depth

The programme combined three elements: new seed varieties, assured procurement at announced prices, and more irrigation and fertiliser. Its reach was concentrated at first in wheat in the north-west, where irrigation was assured, and later extended to rice.

Official statistics show a large increase in foodgrain output between the early 1970s and 1990 and a move from net imports to roughly balanced trade in grain by the early 1970s. The statistics cannot separate the seed programme from other changes of the period, such as the expansion of irrigation, fertiliser use and support prices, and from weather variation. The 1972-74 period shows that output could still fall sharply.

Later assessments focus on the long-run costs in the regions that adopted the package. Reports cited by Down To Earth describe falling productivity growth, declining water tables and salinity in Punjab and Haryana. The authors and officials quoted there generally do not dispute the output gains; they dispute whether the input-intensive model was sustainable and whether it should have been broader in crops and regions.

Supporters point to the change in the national food position within a decade. Critics point to the concentration of benefits and the environmental costs. Both readings draw on the same output and input data, and differ mainly on which time horizon and which regions are given weight.

Sources

  3. Is the joyride over? (Green Revolution and its sustainability)
    Down To Earth (Centre for Science and Environment)Media

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